Criminal Law--Kidnapping--Detention for Period of Hours Held Incidental to Rape (People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 (1967)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 4 Volume 42, April 1968, Number 4 Article 8 
April 2013 
Criminal Law--Kidnapping--Detention for Period of Hours Held 
Incidental to Rape (People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 (1967)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1968) "Criminal Law--Kidnapping--Detention for Period of Hours Held Incidental to 
Rape (People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 (1967))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 42 : No. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss4/8 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CRiMINAL LAw--KIDNAPPING--DETENTION FOR PERIOD OF
HOURS HELD INCIDENTAL TO RAPE.--Defendant, a pharmacist, was
charged with having drugged three young women in his employ and
transporting them in this condition to a motel where he attempted
intercourse on one occasion and sexual advances short of intercourse
on the two others. In two instances, the women were kept at the
motel for periods in excess of twelve hours. In reversing the sub-
sequent kidnapping conviction, the New York Court of Appeals held
that Section 1250 of the old Penal Law, which was then in effect,
was applicable only to "true" kidnapping situations and not where
the confinement or asportation occurs as a subsidiary incident to
another crime. People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 229 N.E.2d
206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1967).
Kidnapping was defined at common law as the forceable taking
of a person from his country and sending him into another. It was
punished as a misdemeanor.1 Prior to the twentieth century, kid-
napping is not reported as having frequently occurred, but, pre-
sumably because of the advent of the automobile, kidnapping be-
came more common in this country.2 In the late 1920's and early
1930's, a wave of kidnappings, culminating in the Lindberg case,
led Congress and the state legislatures to increase the scope and
severity of punishment for this crime.3 By 1952, sixteen states
punished kidnapping by life imprisonment as compared to three
states in 1932.4 Under these revised kidnapping laws, which were
usually broadly written, states were able to obtain convictions for
acts that had as their motive the accomplishment of other crimes.
For example, in Cowan v. State,5 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed defendant's conviction for kidnapping in a situation that
was actually an attempted rape. In this case, the defendant saw
a car containing two teenage couples stop at an isolated lovers' lane.
The defendant, armed with a pistol and threatening to use it, en-
tered the car and confined the occupants there for several hours
while he attempted to convince the two girls to have intercourse
with him by threatening to hold them there until they gave in. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held that this conduct fell within the
meaning and intent of the kidnapping statute" without considering
1 W. CLARK & W. MARSHAL, CRinEs § 10.23, at 742 (7th ed. 1967).
2 Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUm. L. REv.
540 (1953). The automobile and modern highways provided kidnappers
with a swift, and therefore effective, means of executing the crime. It was
used by criminals during the Prohibition Era to enforce the code of the
underworld, and was later used to extort large sums of money from
ordinary citizens. Pd.
3Id.
4 Id. n.4.
5208 Tenn. 512, 347 S.W.2d 37 (1961).
6TENN. QODE AxN. §39-2601 (1955) describes a kidnapper as "[a]ny
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the issue of attempted rape. In an Arizona case,7 the defendant,
with the ultimate purpose of commiting rape, forced the victim to
walk, at knife point, from a trailer to a nearby cabana. Such acts
were held sufficient to sustain a conviction for kidnapping."
Until recently, the state of New York has been using a defi-
nition of the crime of kidnapping that is essentially the same as
that used one hundred years ago. In New York's Penal Code of
1865 a kidnapper was defined as a person who without lawful
authority, forcibly seized and confined another, or inveigled or
kidnapped another, with intent, either:
1. To cause such other person to be secretly confined or
imprisoned in this state against his will; or,
2. To cause such other person to be sent out of this state
against his will; or,
3. To cause such person to be sold as a slave, or in any way
held to service against his willY
Section 1250(1) of the New York Penal Law, in effect until
September 1, 1967, conformed almost word for word with the
1865 statute except that the more recent law did not require that
the confinement be secretive in cases of simple confinement.10 With
this broad statute, New York was able to obtain convictions under
charges of kidnapping for criminal acts which would appear to
constitute other crimes. In People v. Hope," the victims entered
a car parked in front of one of their homes in New York City.
person who forceably or unlawfully confines . . . another, with the intent
to cause him to be secretly confined, or imprisoned against his will. .. '
7State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998, cer. denied, 375 U.S. 46
(1963).
sAxxz. REV. STAT. AN. §13-492(a) (1956): "A person . . . who
seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or car-
ries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold
or detain, or who holds or detains such individual for ransom, reward or
otherwise . . . is guilty of a felony."
It is interesting to note that California has avoided the problem of
over-broadness. CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 is a broad kidnapping statute similar
to those discussed above, but carrying a maximum penalty of twenty-
five years. On the other hand, CAL. PEN. CoDE § 209 specifically provides
for the crime of kidnapping with intent to commit extortion, robbery, or
hold for ransom. Where the victim suffers bodily harm, the defendant
may be punished by death or life imprisonment with no possibility of parole,
but with a maximum of life imprisonment with a possibility of parole
vhere there is no bodily harm.
9 N.Y. PEN. CoDE ch. IV, § 272, 2 Rev. Stat. 664, § 28.
10 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1250(1).
11257 N.Y. 147, 177 N.E. 402 (1931).
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Three men approached the car and at gunpoint ordered the victims
to drive to Long Island. The car was driven for about a mile
before the defendants fled. The Court found that the specific intent
to secretly confine was met in this case. The necessary intent was
inferred from the confinement itself. The secrecy requirement was
met in that the defendants concealed their purpose from the general
public by making the victims act as if they were willing partici-
pants. 12 The Court stated that "[tihe confinement and detention
in the automobile for a short time, coupled with the intent, brings
the case within the purview of the statute." "I In People v. Florio,14
a kidnapping conviction was sustained although the abduction and
asportation were merely incidental to and facilitative of a rape.
Here, the defendants lured the victim into a car in Manhattan,
drove her to an isolated spot in Queens and raped her. The Court
concluded that the acts of the defendants "constituted the separate
and distinct crime of kidnapping. It was true kidnapping in the
popular understanding as well as the legal 'spirit and intent' of
the statute." 1 The Court admitted that mere detention occurring
during the "immediate act of commission ' ' le of the rape would not
be the basis for a separate crime of kidnapping, but gave no indica-
tion of what was meant by the immediate act of commission, or the
amount of time required. The Court did, however, discuss with
approval People v. Small,"' wherein a kidnapping, according to the
Florio Court, was sustained for a detention which took less than
two minutes, on the basis that any "detention against one's will, 8
without authority of law,19 if willful and intentional, is sufficient to
constitute kidnapping.
' 20
While New York was implementing this broad definition,
other jurisdictions were moving in the opposite direction with a
far more narrow view. It was not, however, until 1965 that
2Id. at 153-54, 177 N.E. at 404.
13Id. at 154, 177 N.E. at 404.
4301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
15Id. at 49, 92 N.E.2d at 882.
1" Id.
17274 N.Y. 551, 10 N.E.2d 546 (1937).
s See People v. Koslow, 6 App. Div. 2d 713, 174 N.Y.S.2d 709 (2d
Dep't 1958).
19See People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).
2"People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 50-51, 92 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1950)
(footnotes supplied).
2"See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 464 (1946), wherein the
United States Supreme Court, in reversing a conviction for inveigling,
decoying and transporting a child across state lines, rejected a loose con-
struction of statutory language since it "conceivably could lead to the
punishment of anyone who induced another to leave his surroundings and
do some innocent or illegal act of benefit to the former. . . ." See also
State v. Dove, 75 S.D. 460, 67 N.W.2d 917 (1955).
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New York began to follow this lead. In People v. Levy,2 2 the New
York Court of Appeals overruled the Florio decision by limiting
the application of the kidnapping statute to
'kidnapping' in the conventional sense in which that term has now
come to have acquired meaning. There may well be situations in which
actual kidnapping in this sense can be established in conjunction with
other crimes where there has been a confinement or restraint amounting
to kidnapping to consummate the other crime 3
Unfortunately, such a situation was not delineated more clearly by
the Court. Apparently the Court intended to limit the statute to
what is commonly accepted as kidnapping, i.e., a confinement for the
purpose of extortion or ransom, without foreclosing the possibility
of having a kidnapping even though another crime has been com-
mitted. The question remaining was when such a situation could be
found to have occurred. The Court in Levy merely asserted the conclu-
sion that "the case now before us is essentially robbery and not
kidnapping." 24  The delineation, assuming such a situation exists,
was, therefore, left to the future.
Paralleling this judicial narrowing of the applicability of
New York's statute, the Temporary Committee on the Revision
of the Penal Law and the Criminal Code submitted a revision of
the kidnapping statute wherein the definition of
the crime of kidnapping is carefully limited to what are commonly con-
ceived to be genuine 'kidnapping' cases involving some substantial re-
moval or confinement together with an objective of holding for ransom
or some other purpose usually associated with kidnapping. Other and
lesser unlawful removals or restraints of the types mentioned are cov-
ered by newly-created lesser offences entitled 'False imprisonment' and
'Custodial interference.' 2 5
Use of the phrase "substantial confinement" and the proposal for
the creation of the lesser offenses evidenced a desire to remove
from the crime of kidnapping those crimes in which there is a
detention but in which the crime is not in essence kidnapping.
In other words, mere incidental confinement in the commission
of another crime would no longer be considered kidnapping.
The Commission's proposed bill would have accomplished
this result by requiring a specific intent:
22 15 N.Y2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 381
U.S. 938 (1965).
23Id. at 164-65, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (1965).
24 Id.
2 N.Y. TEMP. Corm. oN PmsIslON OF PEm. LAW AND CRIM. CODE,
THIRD INTMUm REP., Leg. Doc. No. 14, at 23 (1964).
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(a) To hold such person for ransom; or
(b) To use him as a shield or hostage; or
(c) To inflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or abuse him
sexually; or
(d) To terrorize him or a third person; or
(e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function.26
In other words, the requirement of a specific intent was seen as
the means of insuring the limitation of the kidnapping statute
to "genuine" kidnapping.
Had the proposed bill been enacted it would appear that the
dictum in Levy to the effect that one may be convicted of kid-
napping in conjunction with a conviction for another crime would
have been resolved. Only in those areas specifically enumerated
could a conviction for kidnapping have been sustained. However,
the Revised Penal Law, as ultimately enacted, appears to leave
this question open. Kidnapping, under the revised law, is divided
into two degrees, kidnapping second and kidnapping first. 7  Kid-
napping in the first degree, in addition to a genuine kidnapping
situation,28 provides, as did the proposed bill, that a kidnapping
can occur in conjunction with other crimes, but does so more
inclusively than the proposed bill would have. Instead of the
limited areas referred to in the proposed bill, which, interestingly,
did not include robbery, the crime of kidnapping first degree is
written in terms of an intent to " [a]ccomplish or advance the
commission of a felony." 29 It should be noted, however, that
such a result is reached only when the detention is for a period
of more than twelve hours. Thus, the Legislature sought to limit
the harsh penalty for kidnapping first degree, i.e., either life
imprisonment or death, to "the most reprehensible kinds of abduc-
tion." 30 Thus, it appears that the prior case law rule in Levy
that a kidnapping conviction cannot be sustained where it "is
essentially robbery and not kidnapping" has now been abrogated,
but only in situations where the detention is for more than twelve
hours.
26 S. Intro. No. 3918, A. Intro. No. 5376, Comm'n Staff Notes § 140.15.
27 Ray. Pal. LAW §§ 135.20, 135.25.
-REv. PEN. LAW § 135.25(1) provides for a kidnapping in the first
degree where defendant abducts when "[h]is intent is to compel a third
person to pay or deliver money or property as ransom, or to engage in
other particular conduct, or to refrain from engaging in particular con-
duct. . ..
29REv. PEN. LAW § 135.25(2) (b). It should be noted that subdivision
(1) of § 135.25 provides for a conviction of kidnapping first degree When
there is an abduction with the intent to compel a third person to pay
ransom or engage in or refrain from some particular conduct
30Rav. Pmx. LAW, Comm'n Staff Notes, art. 135.
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Kidnapping in the second degree is defined more broadly and
without any time limitations: "A person is guilty of kidnapping
in the second degree when he abducts another person." 31 Under
this provision, the question raised in Levy is once again revived.
When the confinement is for a period of less than twelve hours
and when it occurs in furtherance of the commission of another
crime, can there be a conviction for kidnapping in the second
degree? In other words, with respect to kidnapping second degree,
is a negative inference to be drawn from the abrogation of the
Levy rule in the section defining kidnapping first degree? The
answer to this question would seem to have to be no. Where
the law was settled before a revision of the statute, a mere change
in phraseology will not result in a change in law unless the
legislative intent to make such a change is manifest.32  The Legis-
lature, according to the Commission Staff Notes, did not refer
to the problem dealt with in Levy, i.e., when is the conduct
essentially kidnapping or another crime. Kidnapping second degree
is written in the same broad language as the old law, except for
the addition of the term abduct, which is specifically defined as
the intent to prevent one's liberation by either "(a) secreting or
holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or
(b) using or threatening to use deadly physical force." 3 The
importance of the addition of "abduct" is to provide a differentia-
tion between kidnapping second degree and the lesser penalty of
unlawful imprisonment, which merely requires a restraint.3 4  As
the Commission Staff Notes indicate, "abduction is a very serious
form of restraint, savoring strongly of the substantial removal,
isolation and/or violence usually associated with genuine kid-
napping."35 Although the word abduction is specifically defined,
its definition connotes a broad application much like the prior law
and, thus, necessitates the use of the Levy rule to limit it to
genuine kidnapping situations. 36
31 REv. PEN. LAW § 135.20.
32 See Rr.v. PEN. LAW, Comm'n Staff Notes, art. 135.
33 REV. Pzx. LAW § 135.00(2).
3 4 RP. Pax. LAW, Comm'n Staff Notes, art. 135.
35 Id.
36 It is recognized that a contrary argument might be made to the effect
that since the Legislature, in kidnapping first degree, drew an arbitrary line
at twelve hours, therefore, all abductions resulting in confinement of less
than twelve hours, where there is an intent to commit a felony, would
ipso facto constitute kidnapping second degree. This argument is rejected
because, had the Legislature intended such a result, it could have ex-
pressly so provided. Instead, the statute was written in the broadest of
language. Secondly, where there is doubt, all inferences are to be drawn
in favor of the criminal defendant. People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500,
158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959). Thirdly, in conjunction with
the foregoing reasons, the general rules of statutory construction discussed
in the text compel the conclusion that the Levy rule is not abrogated.
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In the instant case, People v. Lombardi,3 7 defendant was
charged with having given barbiturates to female employees, on
three separate occasions, on the pretext that they were nail hard-
ening pills. Within twenty to thirty minutes the pills would put
the victims to sleep, induce light-headedness and dizziness, and
adversely affect musclar coordination. Defendant, on each occa-
sion, drove his victim, in this condition, from his store in Man-
hattan to a motel in Queens where he attempted intercourse with
one of the women and made sexual advances short of intercourse
toward the other two. The time during which the victims were
detained ranged from ten to fifteen hours. On these facts, the
defendant was convicted of three charges of kidnapping, one of
attempted first degree rape and three charges of assault, second
degree.
The New York Court of Appeals, in reversing the kidnapping
conviction, pointed out that while the conduct of the defendant
came within the literal terms of the penal law in effect at the time
of the crimew it did not fall within "the direction of the criminal
law ...to limit the scope of the kidnapping statute. . .." The
Court apparently felt that a conviction in this case would be a
movement away from the existing trend toward limitation of the
crime of kidnapping, back to earlier practices of finding kid-
napping in acts that were essentially other crimes.4 0 The Court
pointed out that the asportation played no significant role in the
crime and that it would have been essentially the same if com-
mitted by the defendant in his own store.4' This case, the Court
stated, was essentially like People v. Florio,42 where the charge
of kidnapping had been sustained but which was subsequently
expressly overruled by People v. Levy.4S In the instant case, the
victims were drugged and brought from Manhattan to Queens
where the intercourse was attempted but not completed. In
Florio, the victim was taken by force from Manhattan to Queens
where the rape was consummated. Levy held, according to the
Court in the instant case, that the "detention or asportation of a
victim for a relatively short time as an incident to robbery [or
in this case rape] should not normally be prosecuted as kidnap-
ping." " The Court noted that the legislature had made the
3 20 N.Y2d 266, 229 N.E.2d 206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1967).
u N.Y. PEx. LAW § 1250(l).39 People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y2d 266, 270, 229 N.E2d 206, 208, 282
N.Y.S2d 519, 521 (1967).
40 E.g., People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950); People
v. Hope, 257 N.Y. 147, 177 N.E. 402 (1931).
4' 20 N.Y2d at 270-71, 229 N.E2d at 208, 252 N.Y.S2d at 521.
42301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
43 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E2d 824, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965).
People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y2d 266, 271, 229 N.E.2d 206, 209, 282
N.Y.S.2d 519, 522 (1967).
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definition more explicit with respect to kidnapping in the first
degree 5 and that this case would seem to meet that new defini-
tion, but stated that Levy, and not this new definition, was the
applicable rule in this case.46 Accordingly the Court concluded
that Lombardi's kidnapping conviction should be reversed.
Judge Burke, dissenting, was of the opinion that the facts of the
instant case were distinguishable from Levy, and, therefore, the
Lev limitation did not apply. He pointed out that the Levy case
involved a drive of a mere twenty-seven city blocks and a twenty-
minute period of detention. Therefore, there was involved con-
duct that was essentially a robbery.
In developing his argument, Judge Burke first pointed out
that although the Levy court overruled Florio, it did so in order
to evade the rationale, which is not necessarily the same as reach-
ing a different result on the same facts. In other words, even
under the new rule as announced in Levy, the facts in Florio
might still constitute a kidnapping.47 In further support of his
conclusion that Levy did not dictate the finding that there was
not a genuine kidnapping, it was pointed out that the majority
in Levy expressly recognized that there might well be circum-
stances in which another crime and kidnapping could be sustained.
The fact that the motive for the asportation and detention was
another crime was not seen as a problem since a kidnapping
"invariably has its basis in another crime, whether it be extortion,
robbery, rape, etc. .... 4," The substantial asportation and sub-
stantial detention present in the instant case, as compared to Levy,
led the dissent to conclude that the defendant was guilty of
kidnapping in every sense, "conventional and otherwise." 4 9
The Court in Lombardi has thus extended the Levy holding,
i.e., a defendant may not be convicted for kidnapping where the
act of restraint (or abduction) is but incidental to the commission
of an independent crime, to facts as presented by the instant case.
Uncertainty remains as to what facts would sufficiently support
the conclusion that this act of restraint or abduction was not
sufficiently incidental to the other crime. Or, is it likely that no
such facts exist? The rejection, by the majority, of the dissent's
points of distinction between the two cases is most enlightening.
45 REv. PENz. LAW § 135.25.
46 20 N.Y.2d at 271, 229 N.E.2d at 209, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The Court
noted that the time during which the victims were held was not factually
determined at the trial. It was uncertain when the drug took effect and
when it wore off in considering the length of time during which it was
used as an instrument of restraint. Id. at 271-72, 229 N.E.2d at 209, 282
N.Y.S.2d at 522.4 7Id. at 274, 229 N.E.2d at 210, 282 N.Y.S2d at 524 (dissenting
opinion).
48 Id.
40 Id.
1968 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The dissent was most emphatic in distinguishing Lombardi
and Levy factually. That is, according to the dissent, a confine-
ment for a period of between ten and fifteen hours, in conjunction
with an asportation of a considerable distance, constituted a
restraint or abduction which is not merely incidental. In other
words, such chronological and geographical factors are the deter-
minants of the distinction between a genuine and an incidental
kidnapping. The majority's rejection of this argument points
out that, a fortiori, neither element existing independently
will be sufficient to conclude that there was a genuine
kidnapping. Secondly, and more importantly, the rejection of the
factual distinctions necessarily means that if there are to be any
distinguishing features left for the future so that a court may find
that a kidnapping second degree conviction will be sustained in
conjunction with the commission of another crime, the distinction
must be that the confinement evidenced an intent to confine,
separate and distinct from the intent to commit the other crime.
In other words, the question is whether the initial act constitutes
a necessary element in the ultimate commission of the other
substantive crime, or whether it exists in and of itself and not
as an element of the other crime. In, for example, drugging of the
victims in the commission of a rape, it is first necessary to sub-
ject the victim to the will of the attacker before the crime can be
consummated. In Lombardi, the initial act of drugging was
undertaken as the first element of the substantive crime of rape,
i.e., subjecting the victim to the defendant's will. All intervening
acts have no other purpose than the consummation of the rape.
Therefore, under such circumstances, there could not be a convic-
tion for kidnapping in the second degree.
One possible situation, and perhaps the only situation in
which a conviction for kidnapping in the second degree could be
sustained within this framework, would occur when the abduction
is such that in itself it satisfies its own formulated ends and
the subsequent crime is one that could be seen as an afterthought.
This could occur where the defendant is such that he desires
the feelings of power and control that result from the abduction,
and, before freeing his hostage, decides to then commit a robbery
or some other substantive crime. Similarly, it could occur where
the victim is abducted in order to consummate a crime against
a third entity, e.g., using someone to drive a getaway car against
his will, and, again, before the victim is released, a crime is
committed against him. Obviously, such possibilities portend a
limited application.
Thus, as has been shown, the courts are now very much
concerned with limiting kidnapping to what is considered a genuine
kidnapping in order to have the penalty fit the crime. In such
a determination, two separate intents must be found in order to
[ VoL. 42
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sustain a kidnapping conviction. Accordingly, the kidnapping stat-
ute will now be restrictively applied. Admittedly, there was a
need for a limitation, but the question is whether the limitation
has been too extensive. For example, the crimes of kidnapping
and rape are not ones which have to merge, as assault and
murder do, when they are present in the same fact pattern. The
two acts violate separate rights of the person. Rape forces upon
a person a sexual contact against that person's will. Kidnapping
is a restraint on personal liberty which includes inherent dangers
not present in other crimes. It exposes the victim to the danger
of death or bodily injury, since the asportation is frequently
accompanied by use of force, and it can also be the cause of
psychic injury to the victim and his relatives. 50 These added
dangers seem to justify the imposition of greater punishment than
would be involved in other crimes. These dangers, however,
are not caused by the intent of the defendant. Rather they are
caused by the detention itself, regardless of whether the intent
is monetary gain by extortion or personal gain from a sexual outlet.
It is contended that the danger from a forced detention so that
a rape may be committed is just as great, if not greater than,
the danger caused by detention for the purpose of extortion.
The situation seems analogous to a fact pattern in which larceny
and burglary are involved. Burglary involves entering unlawfully
or remaining in a building with intent to commit a crime therein,51
while larceny consists of the wrongful taking of property from
its owner.5 2  Just as an intent to commit larceny would not
constitute a defense to a burglary charge, so the intent to rape
should not be allowed as a defense to a charge of kidnapping.
If a criminal enters a house unlawfully and steals something while
there, charges of burglary and larceny could be sustained because
the criminal performed acts constituting separate crimes. If a
criminal commits separate acts which constitute both rape and
kidnapping, he should be punished for both. If a criminal intended
to commit a robbery and in the course of the robbery he com-
mitted a homicide, he would be punished for both crimes because
his conduct was such that two essentially different crimes were
committed. So, where a person intends a rape and actually
commits a kidnapping, he should be punished for that which he
did commit-two different crimes. In determining when a kid-
napping is actually committed, an approach similar to Judge
Burke's is available. On the basis of the facts, especially the
geographical and chronological factors, we simply determine
S0Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUm. L. Rsv.
540, 554-55 (1953).W. REv. PE:N. LAW § 140.20.
52 REV. Pmi. LAW § 155.05.
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whether the confinement is substantial. It should be remembered
that such an approach only applies to kidnapping in the second
degree, which carries a penalty of up to twenty-five years. For
what the legislature considered the more serious situations, deten-
tions for more than twelve hours with the intent to commit a
felony, they have seen fit to provide for the harshest of penalties.
Therefore, the disparities that existed prior to the revision will
not serve as a reason for limiting the kidnapping statute when
only the second degree is involved.
